Apu Debnath v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-9-2018 
Apu Debnath v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Apu Debnath v. Attorney General United States" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 981. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/981 
This November is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
           NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






APU CHANDRA DEBNATH, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                                                         Respondent  
_______________________ 
 
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Agency No. A209-953-809 
Immigration Judge: Honorable John B. Carle 
_______________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 24, 2018 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 





                                           
*   This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 




SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 Apu Chandra Debnath, a citizen of Bangladesh, petitions for review of a decision 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed and adopted the Immigration 
Judge’s decision denying his application for asylum based on religious persecution.  
Because substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Debnath was not persecuted in 
Bangladesh, we will deny the petition. 
I. 
 Debnath practiced Hinduism in Bangladesh, a country that is predominantly 
Muslim and that has designated Islam as its state religion.  He encouraged other residents 
in his town of Noakhali to “worship our God” and attend Hindu community programs. 
This activity led some members of the Bangladesh Islamic Organization to both threaten 
and attack him.  
 On three occasions between June 2014 and April 2015, members of the Noakhali 
Bangladesh Islamic Organization demanded that Debnath convert to Islam or leave the 
country.  Organization members threatened that, if he did not comply, they would behead 
him.  When conveying at least one of these threats, a member held a knife to Debnath’s 
throat.   
 After a two-month period without any threats or reprisals, several Organization 
members attacked Debnath at a Hindu festival in Noakhali.  Ten members told him that 




he could not practice Hinduism in Bangladesh, and then three members hit him in the 
forehead with metal-topped wooden sticks.  After the attack, a doctor gave Debnath four 
stitches and various medications.   
 Debnath attended another Hindu festival in February 2016 and was attacked again 
by the same members of the Bangladesh Islamic Organization.  They repeated that he 
needed to convert to Islam or leave Bangladesh and stabbed him in his legs, causing him 
to return to the same doctor and receive more stitches.  Although Debnath left Noakhali 
and traveled to his uncle’s house in a town 80 miles away, he remained a target of the 
Organization.  Some of its members obtained his cell-phone number and called him, 
telling him not to return home and that “[w]herever you go, our organization will find 
you.”  
Debnath’s father decided that his son should leave Bangladesh and try to live with 
another uncle in the United States.  Debnath journeyed to the United States but was 
detained and charged with being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for 
lacking a “valid entry document.”  He conceded removability but applied for asylum 
based on religious persecution.1   
                                           
1  Debnath also applied for withholding of removal, protection under the Convention 
Against Torture, and asylum based on membership in a particular social group, but on 
appeal he has abandoned any arguments that he is entitled to these forms of relief.   




 At a hearing before an IJ, Debnath described the Bangladesh Islamic 
Organization’s attacks and threats as well as his belief that he would be killed by this 
group if he returned to Bangladesh, regardless of where he lived.  
The IJ found Debnath credible but denied his asylum application.  The IJ decided 
that the attacks and threats Debnath experienced were too “isolated” and insufficiently 
severe to establish that he had been persecuted and that he failed to show that he had a 
well-founded fear of future persecution.  The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and 
adopted the IJ’s decision.   
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(1) to review the Board’s decision.  
Shehu v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 482 F.3d 652, 656 (3d Cir. 2007).  The Board, having 
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), adopted the IJ’s decision without 
providing additional analysis of Debnath’s asylum application, so we review that decision 
in addition to the Board’s.  See Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2002); 
Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 548–49 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).  We review for 
substantial evidence the IJ’s factual findings regarding whether Debnath suffered past 
persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution.  See Gao, 299 F.3d at 272. 
III. 
 On appeal, Debnath argues that the IJ erred by concluding that the attacks he 
suffered constituted mere “isolated incidents” of violence and not past persecution.  He 




asserts that the attacks were not isolated because the same members of the Bangladesh 
Islamic Organization perpetrated the two attacks for the same purpose—to punish him for 
practicing Hinduism.  He adds that the IJ further erred by failing to consider the threats 
and violence he experienced in aggregate and by minimizing the seriousness of these 
attacks and threats.   
 Regardless of how the link between the two attacks is characterized, the IJ 
permissibly decided that they were insufficiently serious to qualify as persecution. 
“[P]ersecution denotes extreme conduct.”  Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 
2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Here, the attacks did not rise to 
this high bar because Debnath was attacked only twice and his injuries required that he 
receive just several stiches.  See Kibinda v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 477 F.3d 113, 117, 119–20 
(3d Cir. 2007) (upholding finding that petitioner did not suffer past persecution by getting 
struck in face by “heavy object” and requiring seven stitches); cf. Voci, 409 F.3d at 610, 
614 (ruling that the Board erred in determining that applicant had not been persecuted 
despite being beaten at least seven times and sustaining injuries requiring “extended 
hospitalization”).  Moreover the IJ did assess in combination the threats and attacks, 
ruling that “the two physical attacks … and threats … are insufficient to establish 
persecution.”  As a final matter, the IJ did not diminish the death threats made against 
Debnath but reasonably decided that they were not “so menacing as to cause significant 
actual suffering or harm.”  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006) 




(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Ladyha v. Holder, 588 F.3d 574, 577 
(8th Cir. 2009) (upholding finding that petitioner “threatened at knifepoint” was not 
persecuted); Datau v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 37, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding finding 
that death threat at knifepoint did not show persecution).2 
 Debnath next contends that because the IJ found his testimony credible, the IJ 
should have accepted his assertion that the attacks were “severe,” which, he suggests, 
would compel the conclusion that he had been persecuted.  But “[t]he fact that, as here, a 
petitioner’s testimony is deemed credible is not determinative” because this fact does not 
mean that the attacks and threats met the threshold of extreme conduct.  Shardar v. 
Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2004).  Debnath also argues that the IJ erred by not 
identifying the corroborating evidence that he needed to bolster his testimony and thereby 
meet his burden to obtain relief.  Yet the IJ did not rely on a lack of corroborating 
evidence in denying relief (in fact, the IJ credited Debnath’s testimony in its entirety), so 
he had no obligation to inform Debnath of missing corroborating evidence.  See Voci, 409 
F.3d at 616–17.  
IV. 
                                           
2  Because we conclude that the IJ permissibly decided that Debnath has not suffered past 
persecution, we need not reach his arguments that the IJ erred in finding that police in 
Noakhali were willing and able to control his attackers and that he is entitled to the 
presumption, based on his past persecution, that he had a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.   




 For the reasons discussed above, we will deny the petition for review. 
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Apu Debnath v. Attorney General of the United States, No. 17-3807 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
 
I concur in the judgment of the majority denying the petition for review. However, 
in my view, Debnath’s petition fails not because the threats and violence he was 
subjected to are insufficiently serious or isolated in nature. Rather, I would reach the 
same result upon a conclusion that Debnath “has not demonstrated that his past harm and 
fears of future harm was or will be inflicted by the government of Bangladesh or by a 
non-governmental actor that the government is unwilling or unable to control.” A.R. 3 
(BIA decision); see also A.R. 63 (IJ decision) (“Even if a reviewing Court were to find 
Respondent’s past experiences in Bangladesh rise to a level of past persecution, 
Respondent has not persuaded this Court that the government of Bangladesh is unable or 
unwilling to control the individuals who harmed Respondent.”); Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 
F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002); Kibinda v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 477 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 
2007).  
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